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I. Introduction
E CONOMIC-DEMOGRAPHIC interrelationships have received considerable attention over the past decade. Of particular interest has been the effect of cohort size on labor market variables such as relative income, labor force participation, unemployment, and fertility. Richard A. Easterlin's (1968) seminal study analyzed the potential of a long-run economic cycle generated by shifts in the fertility rate. The key independent variable in his analysis was a measure of cohort size. Large cohorts suffered a depression in their relative wages and, hence, begot small cohorts. The higher relative income of the smaller cohorts was hypothesized to lead to a renewed upswing in fertility.
Studies on labor force participation rates (Wachter, 1972 (Wachter, , 1976 indicated that large cohorts had higher labor force participation rates. Equilibrium unemployment rates were also shown to increase as large cohorts entered the labor market (Perry, 1971; Wachter, 1976; and Ehrenberg, 1980 )_ The impact of cohort size on relative income was explored, for example, by Freeman (1979) , Welch (1979) , and Berger (1981) .
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The effect of cohort size on school enrollment rates has received less attention than the demographic impact on unemployment and relative wages. Richard Freeman's important study, The Overeducated American, touched upon the influence of cohort size, but his focus was on the declining rate of return to education.
1 In a review article, Smith and Welch (1978) emphasized the cohort theme and argued that this factor caused the decline in the rate of return to education. Mattila (1982) examined the effects of rates of return to education on school enrollment rates and mentioned that cohort size might be a cause of the changes in the rate of return. The notion that school enrollment rates have responded positively to cohort overcrowding received empirical support from Wachter and Kim (1982) . That study found that cohort overcrowding led to a flow of individuals out of employment into unemployment, school, and out of the labor force.
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In this study we argue that the effects of cohort overcrowding may be more complicated in that important asymmetric effects may be the dominant characteristics. Specifically, for some phenomena the size of the cohort may be less important to individual decisions than the position of individuals relative to the peaks and troughs of the demographic cycle. This model is tested on school enrollment rate fluctuations. The basic hypothesis, as applied to this time series, is that individuals born at the beginning of the baby boom are likely to have the highest enrollment rates while those born at the end are likely to have the lowest rates -even though both groups were born into cohorts of equal size (relative to the overall population). The rationale for the hypothesis, which we refer to as the differential tracking model, is that the maximization of discounted lifetime earnings pushes individuals to distance themselves as much as possible from the peak fertility year cohorts.
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The model is explained in sec tion II. The empirical results, based on enrollment rate dat a for the U nited States, are presented in sectio n III. Section IV draws th e conclusions and implications of th e model for economic policy.
II. The Differential Tracking Model
Consider a model where all individual s go through two stages-one where they combine schooling and work and the other where they onl y work. Individuals hold two jobs over their worklife : a ca reer job an d an en try or yo uth job. The crucial demographic effect that individuals must deal with is that the career j ob wage varies inversely with cohort size.
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Born into a specific cohort, indi viduals face either favorab le or unfavorabl e prospects. They
Can however alter their initial fate or cohort size ' ' in order to improve their prospects. In our stylized model , individuals can be viewed essentially as shifting th eir career cohort by adjusting school enrollment ra tes so as to maximize discounted lifetime earnings.
The key to maximizing lifetime income is to be in the smallest size career cohort possible and thus have the highest career wage possible. If a small cohort is ahead, individuals take the fast track by attending school more intensively. This enables them to move ahead so as to be a member of and to compete with that smaller cohort. Trailed b y a small cohort, individuals take the slow track, extending their noncareer entry jobs and absorbing their education at a leisurely pace. This tracking system is illustrated in figure 1 Note that the slow track is slow only with respect to the delay in starting the career job. 4 After individuals devote a minimum amount of time to stage one, they choose how much of their remaining worklife to devote to each stage. Individuals taking the normal track (case A) spend T 1 in the first period and obtain an average amount 3 To a lesser extent this is also true of the youth wage , bu t in our formal development of the model, we assumed that the yo uth wage was constant to facilitate th e analysis. . 4 For ease of exposition, the fast and slow tracks m figure l have th e same career wage. No te, however, that an y si ngl e individual cannot move fo rward or backward with the same resulting career wage. The analysis in the next section will indicate whi ch individuals can improve th eir caree r wage by moving for.vard and which individuals benefit fro m movi ng backward across cohorts. Time T o f schooling. They then find career jobs at a wage determined by the initial cohort size. Individuals taking the fast track (case B) also spend T 1 in the first stage. However, these individuals obtain more than average schooling and so incur added costs associated with school enrollment during the first stage. In stage two, they are able to compete with earlier and smaller cohorts in order to earn a higher career wage. Individuals taking the slow track (case C) delay entering the career labor market until T{ and incur a cost which depends upon the differential between the career wage and the entry wage. They can then compete with a smaller cohort in stage two and earn a higher career wage. The choices available to the individual are thus to move to an earlier career cohort through intensive schooling, to move to a later cohort via less or more leisurely schooling, or to stay in the same birth cohort.
Given that the career wage is assumed to be inversely related to cohort size, it can be shown that individuals will move away from the peak cohort by obtaining more schooling in the pre-peak region and by delaying career entry in the postpeak region. In particular, individuals move ahead in terms of their career cohort so that the ma rginal benefit or higher wage received from an additional unit of schooling equals the marginal cost of obtaining that unit in terms of forgo ne earni ngs on entry jobs a nd the marginal cos t of education.
Whereas the margi nal cost of moving ahead is a function of the cost of sch ooling and the res ulting forgo ne yo uth wage, for a n individual moving backward , the marginal cost of moving is a fun cti on of the adult-yout h wage di ffere nti al for th e extra time spen t in youth jobs. The abi lity of individu als to move to a desired career cohort is limited by increasing margin al costs of swi tchin g cohorts. A rigorous development o f this model can be found in Wachter and Wascher (1984) .
The tracking effect depends in part on the existence of vintage effec ts in human capital; that is, ra ther than havi ng a single career labor market across age groups, age groups are imperfectly substitutable for each other. In this case, the earnings of older adults are partially shielded from the degree of overcrowding in the entering cohort. Each new group has its own age-earnings profile that only partially reflects excess demand conditions before or af ter the career group.
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To the extent that specific training is pervasive, vintage effects should be important. If there is learning-by-doing, each year's new job entrants will be differentiated and, hence, partially insulated from those coming before and after. Employers who use either formal or informal tenure procedures are validating vintage effects. Most professional and administrative markets function in this way, from universities with formal tenure rules to law firms with virtually formal tenure rules to management positions with a policy of "up or out." Seniority systems for blue collar workers also create formal vintage effects. These employment policies suggest that vintage effects are widespread and, thus, that timing one's entry into the tenure or vintage system can be used to alter one's lifetime earnings stream.
III. Empirical Results
We estimate a model in which individuals are assumed to base school enrollment decisions, 5 Absent this effect, there would be only one age-earnings profile for all career workers. The profile need not be ft at in th at seniority wage increases could be institutionalized. Excess demand conditions, howeve r, would be uniform for all career workers, so that an oversized, entry career group would not experience a disproportionate wage effect compared wi th older career workers.
Empirical tes ting of human capital vintage effects is scanty due to data limitations. Welch (1979) , for example, found th at vi ntage effects existed but were stronges t in the early career years and tended to dissipate with age. Freeman (1980) and Berger (1 981), however, found lasting vintage effects.
ceteris paribus, on the rel a ti ve sizes of the cohorts preceding and following them . This is measured by th e ra ti os of the population approximately ten years ahead or behind to the own cohort population. RS 1 and RS 0 are the relative sizes of the younger and older cohorts, respect ively . 6 The hypotheses have been tes ted using an annual time series of school enrollment fro m 1948 to 1980. Six demographic groups are represented: three age groups-16 to 17, 18 to 19, an d 20 to 24 ; and each age group for males an d females.
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Since our purpose is to tes t our demographic hypo thesis, we have adopted the basic time series schooling equation format generally used by o thers. 8 In addition to the leadin g (RS,. ) and lagging (RS 0 ) cohort b arriers, we have inCluded real income (Y), military (MIL and DRAFT in the male equations) and marriage (MA R in the female equations) variables. A measure of labor market tightness proved to be sta tistically insignifican t and has been omitted from the fin al results.
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Following the specification adopted by Mattila (1982) , two variables are used to capture separately military enlistment and draft effects on school enrollment. The argument is that although draft pressure encourages higher school enrollment ra tes, the rate of enlistment itself will decrease enrollment rates by taking some males who would have enrolled in school otherwise. Draft pressure is measured as the percentage of males inducted into the armed forces between 1960 and 1972, and the enlistment variable is simply the percentage of males in each age cohort in the armed forces .
The results in Crimmins, and Easterlin (1981); and Mattila (1982) . 9 The specific variable used was the aggregate unemployment rate divided by a demographically adjusted measure of the equilibrium unemployment rate U* The coefficients on the UGA P = U I U* variable were not significant for any of the age-sex groups when included in equations simi lar to th ose in tables 1 and 2. We have omitted UGA P from the tables in th e text due to probable rnulticollineari ty between UGA P, Y, and the trend variable . 5. The equations for the 20 to 24 year old groups were estim a ted using a maximum likelihood iterative technique to co rrec t for possible serial correlation.
6. The estima ted values o f p were 0.312 for males a nd 0.287 fo r fem ales.
211
The results of table 1 show that the differential tracking system is highly significant for all of the six age-sex groups with the correct negative sign on the RS variable. Those individuals born prior to a peak fertility rate year have a larger group of competitors following them than ahead (that is, RS is low) and thus have high school enrollment rates. Those individuals with a larger number of competitors ahead of them have lower school enrollment rates. who would have otherwise been enrolled in school. A marriage rate variable is included in the female equations. That variable is negative and significant for every age group.
Efforts to include both a time trend and the real income variable in the model were unsuccessful due to the high collinearity between them. However, the real income variable, when included alone, is always significant, presumably capturing the long-run positive income elasticity that is generally found for school enrollment.
The draft pressure variable is significant and positive for the age group most likely to be drafted, namely, the 18 to 19 year old male group. The enlistment rate va riable is nega tive and significant for every male age group, capturing those males In table 2, we allow for unequal attention to leading and lagging cohorts by including RSY and RS 0 as distinct variables. All of the leading barriers, RS 0 , appear with the expected negative sign and all of the lagging barriers, RS,, with the expected positive sign. Ten of the twelve coefficients are significant with t-values greater than 2. Hence, these results are highly supportive of the asymmetric or differential tracking model. Tests for the equality in absolute value of the coefficients on the leading and lagging barriers did not reject the null hypothesis that changes in the size of leading and lagging cohorts yield equal changes in the school enrollment decisions of individuals.
As mentioned above, our demographic variable measures a different phenomenon from that captured by the tradi tiona! cohort size variable. Specifically, th e own cohort's size variable is equal RSf. = the log of the ratio of the size of the neighboring younger cohort to the size of the own cohort.
RS 0 = the log of the ratio of the size of the neighhoring older cohort to the size of the own cohort.
The estimated values of p in the 20 to 24 age group equations \vere 0.316 for males cmd 0.163 for females.
to the percentage of the total population that is in a particular cohort. It is a measure of the height of the population density function. An alternative structural approach would view enrollment rates as being determined by the rate 10 We also note that in the unconstrained model containing both our demographic variable, RS, and the RP construct. RS remained significant with the expected negative sign in all cases. However, the variable that measures the own cohort's size entered significantly in only two of the six equations (icmaks 16 to 17, 20 to 24), and then only one had the anticipated sign. of return to schooling, which is in turn a function of demographic variables. Our model, however, is a reduced form equation with exogenous variables on the right-hand side. The problem with implementing the structural approach is that our model indicates that observed rates of return are likely to be biased measures of the expected rates. Specifically, the observed rate of return only reflects cohort size pressure of older groups and necessarily excludes the impact of lagging cohort sizes on expected rates of return. Consequently, expectations based only on leading cohort sizes are biased.
We did, however, test our model against the alternative specification which included observable rates of return on education as independent variables. The specific rate of return variable that we used was constructed by Mattila (1982) . In models which contained both the rate of return to education and our demographic variables, the rate of return effect was not statistically significant.
That individuals use lagging as well as leading cohort size indicators in their decision process means that they attempt to use all of the information currently available. There is some support in the literature that individuals are aware of demo-LEVELIN G THE DEMOGRAPHIC CYCLE graphic consideration s. The foreword to Russell (1982) states that, "Probably no one born during the baby boom th a t extended from just after World War II to the early 1960s is unaware of belonging to a special generation." Given current discussi ons over whether school enrollment rates have stopped or even reversed their historical upward swing, it is useful to decompose the enrollment equations to isolate the contribution of the differential tracking model. This decomposition is performed by comparing the fitted values of school enrollment rates using the coefficients in table 1 with the fitted values computed at the means of the demographic variables.
The contribution of the differential tracking model to school enrollment rate trends is shown in table 4.ll The results indicate that teenagers born prior to the peak fertility years increased their school enrollment rates during the 1960s approximately 2.5% above the benchmark level predicted by real income, military, and marriage rate considerations. Those who were 20 to 24 years of age during the 1960s exhibited a 2% increase in school enrollment rates above the benchmark.
II To isolate the demographic contribution to school enrollment rates, we first compute values for school enrollment rates a t the mean of the demographic barrier variable. The contribution o f the differenti al tracking efl"ect can th en be calculated as the fitted school enrollment rates minus the trend school enrollment rates. Because we need to use a benchmark value of RS (in thi s case, the mean) in the computation of the trend, the particular level of the series for the co ntribution o f th e demograp hic va riables is con ditioned on th e value of the benchm ark. That is, we cannot uniquel y d efine, for example, a neutral o r ze ro demograph ic effec t. Since table 4 refer s to th e contribution of the dem ographic effect over the benchm o. rk , we concentrate o n the swi ng in school enrollmen t rates over the 1960s a nd 1970s.
By the late 1970s, demographic considerations had reversed. Although youth cohorts were still large, they were now composed of individuals born after the peak rather than before the peak fertility years. The shift from the fa st to the slow track meant a swing of between 3 and 7 percentage points for school enrollment rates. Teenage enrollment rates were approximately 4 percentage points below our benchmark, while 20 to 24 year olds reduced their rates by less than 1 percentage point.
The results of this model indicate that the unusual swings in school enrollment rates over the past two decades have been an endogenous response to the unusually large swings in the population profile. The trend rate of increase in school enrollment rates seems to be intact, but the intermediate-run demographic cycle has caused large deviations from that trend. In this sense, school enrollment rates were "too high" in the 1960s and were then "too low" in the 1970s.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we advance the hypothesis that individuals respond to cohort overcrowding differently depending upon whether they lead or trail the peak fertility year cohort. To maximize lifetime discounted earnings, individuals act so as to fill in the peaks and troughs of the demographic cycles exhibited by population and, hence, relative income.
The heuristic explanation for this phenomenon is the following: Baby boom individuals born before the peak in the fertility rate increase their human ca pital accumulation as a way of escapi ng from the huge cohort behind th em. Education, THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS TA BLE 4. -CONTIUBUTION Of THE DIFFERE NTI AL TRAC KI NG EFFECT TO C!-1.\:-/GE S I N S C HOO L [ N ROLU!E NT RATES (PERCENTAGE PO I NTS)
Mal es Females 16-17 16 -17 1960-1969 2.63 2.56 1970-1975 -0.77 -0.77 1 '176 -19l>O -4.30 -4.29 wheth er general or specific, can be viewed as a "fast track., , By buying th e ticket (the cost of additional trainin g) and entering the fa st track, the early a rrival s can put greater di stance between them selves and the peak group. Those born after the peak fertilit y year, however, face a different problem . With the bulk of the cohort ahead of them, th ere is no press ure to buy the ticket. The fa st track only leads to an entry spot in the already oversized peak group. Hence, if anything, this group has the incentive of p aying for the least amount of education. This allows them to use the least costly slow track and , hence, to draw closer to the undersized baby bust cohort. Education thus provides a differential tracking mechanism . While individuals cannot choose the cohorts in which they are bo rn , they are able to time their entry into the career labor market through education. Those who want to speed ahead in order to compete with earlier cohorts engage in intensive education during their youth. Those who want to slow down in order to compete with later cohorts extend their noncareer job period and take a more leisurely approach to education.
Thi s asymmetric demographic effect dominates the more traditional cohort size hypothesis. According. to the latter view, it is the size of the cohort rather than one's position relative to the peak and trough that counts. Those born five years before the peak birth rate are predicted to behave in a similar fashion to those born approximately five years after the peak. Although empirical results based on this model suggest that large cohorts tend to have large school enrollment rates, the issue is empirical since the theory itself does not yield a predicted sign.
The asymmetric or differential tracking sys tem indicates that position in the cycle rather than the size of one's initial cohort dominates certain types of decisions such as schooling. This effect helps to explain the surp ri singl y steep decline in school enrollment rates during the 1970s (in relati o n to past trend rates of growth) as well as the very high enrollment rat es observed during the 1960s. Essentiall y, our empirical results indica te that a tte mpts to escape the p eak in cohort overcrowding resulted in a negative swing in school enrollment rates of 3 to 7 percentage points between the 1960s and 1970s.
If it is positio n rather than cohort size that m a tters, then the tendency to move away from peak-sized coh or ts toward tro ugh-sized cohorts should continue to contribute negativel y to enrollment rates fo r several more years. Cohorts entering their youth period will be smaller than preceding cohorts, but more importantly, they will be post-peak cohorts. Thereafter the effect should turn positive.
A lthough we have applied the asymmetric demographic model only to school enrollment rates, it may also affect other labor supply and investment decisions. We view our model and results as tentati ve but perhaps suggestive of these more general applications to the stud y of demographic and economic relationships. The \\·cighting sc he me gives a weight of 1.0 to the closest neig hborin g ,i nglc age groups Jnd dccrcJses the weig ht by l j n for ev ery addi tion J I year, n, a group is from the cohort o f in te rest. l'or C. \amp lc. fo r the 16 to 17 groups. the ne igh boring lagging cohort is defmcd JS 0.1 · POP(6) + O.ll POP( 7) + 0.125 · POP( 'ii ) + t-0.5 · POP(14) + 1.0 · PO P (lS)
The \\ Cights on these arc Jrbit rary and a rc meant to cap ture the de clini ng vin tage crrect:i. Changing the wei ghts had littk dTcct o n the re,;ul ts.
Population in anv Jge-sex gro up is the to tal no nins tituti,,nal population for a given year. For the 20 to 24 groups:
POP 25 -34/ POP 20-24 .
The weigh ts are similar to those above.
4. The Sym metric Demographic variable is th e rel a tive size of the older cohort to the younger co hort. The breakdown is simi lar to that used above.
5. The Own Cohort's Size variable is measured as the population in a give n cohort re la ti ve to the to tal population. 
